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Appellant Simons replies to the Brief of Plaintiff-
Respondent Bonneville Properties, Incorporated ("Bonneville" 
herein) as follows: 
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is axiomatic that the facts on appeal are those 
facts stipulated by the parties or determined by the trial 
court, if supported by the evidence. This Court should, there-
fore, be aware that the facts recited in the Brief of Appellant 
were a substantial restatement of the comprehensive stipulation 
entered at the time of trial. (See Tr. 3-19) By contrast, 
numerous statements advanced by Appellee as "facts" are con--
trary to the stipulated facts, ~ithout support in the findings 
of the trial judge and contrary to the evidence. 
There is no finding, for example, that Bonneville 
"relied" on Simons' published commission. (Br. 1) The asser-
tion that Bonneville "introducted the-ultimate buyer of the 
warehouse to Simons" (Br. 1, 2) is contrary to the stipulated 
facts, the uncontroverted evidence and the findings of the 
trial court.* 
* The stipulated fact is that Bonneville's agent met with a 
representative of Jelco, Inc. (not A.K. Utah) with regard to the 
possibility that the Fashion Fabrics property might be used to 
perform the Swaner exchange agreement. (Tr. 9) Mr. Emanual A. 
Floor testified that Jelco had no authority to represent A.K. 
Utah. (Tr. 231-233) The trial court found that Bonneville 
introduced the "name" of A.K. Utah, but that "neither plaintiff 
nor its agents, L. Richard Sorensen and Dennis Christensen, 
represented A.K. Utah as realtors at any time." (Finding of 
Fact No. 11) 
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Bonneville would further divert the Court with argu-
ment of spurious issues to this litigation. There was no issue 
at trial over whether Bonneville "agreed" to any change in the 
commission split (Br. 1) , a.nd could not be in a claim based 
upon a unilateral contract. The facts, had they been the facts, 
that its principals and agents "met with Simons" (Br. 6) "re-
quested to be in at~endance at all negotiations" (Br. 7), "were 
ready and willing at all times to offer assistance" (Br. 8), or 
that "attorneys for A.K. Utah" had "expressed an intent to pur-
chase" (Br. 7) are of no consequence in this case involving 
performance of such a contract. 
The proper, and we submit, dispositive issue is that 
admitted at Br. 7: 
on the e£fective date of [Simons' change of com-
mission split] no written agreements had been 
reached ••. regarding the sale of the subject 
property and an exchange which was to take place 
thereafter. (emphasis added) 
Appellees do a disservice to this Court by introducing such 
spurious issues. 
POINT I 
THIS COURT HAS NEVER ADOPTED THE 
MINORITY POSITION CONCERNING ACCEPTANCE 
OF OFFERS OF UNILATERAL CONTRACTS 
Bonneville candidly admits at Br. 10 that the decision 
below can be affirmed only if the position of RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS § 45 is the law in Utah. That position is that an offer 
of a unilateral contract implies a promise not to revoke the 
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offer to one who has undertaken "substantial performance." 
The majority of jurisdictions, including Utah, do not 
follow the section relied upon. They adhere, instead, to the 
standards of RESTATEMENT 2d, AGENCY § 447, requiring perfor-
mance of all essential terms of the offer, at least in the ab-
sence of bad faith. Bonneville thus advances a minority posi-
tion on unilateral contracts, never adopted in the State of 
Utah and which, we submit, should not be adopted in this case. 
A. Reliance ~the Auerbach's ~is Misplaced. 
Auerbach's, Inc.~ Kimball, 572 P.2d 376 {Utah 1977), 
despite the urging at Br. 10-11, does not adopt the minority 
position of RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 45, either in specific 
terms or by reasonable inference. Neither does it reject the 
well established law in this jurisdiction respecting real estate 
brokerage contracts of, ~' E.B. Wicks Co. ~Moyle, 103 Utah 
554, 137 P2d 342 (1943). That law is the majority position of 
RESTATEMENT 2d, AGENCY § 447. In fact, the Auerbach's case 
does not even deal with the specialized problem of unilateral 
agreements of subagency in the real estate business. 
The Auerbach's case merely held that an employee 
which had completed thirty-eight years of service, on a promise 
of a pension after thirty years service and the attainment of 
sixty-five years of age, could pursue a claim in quasi contract. 
A summary judgment dismissing the claim was accordingly reversed. 
Auerbach's case addresses none of the issues herein. 
The question of whether an offer of subagency is "fairly and in 
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good faith terminated" (~Wicks, supra at 137 P.2d 345) might 
be an issue on different facts, but in this case even that ques-
tion was stipulated out of the case. It was stipulated that 
Simons in fact believed that he was entitled to a 60% commission 
split (Tr. 11), as per the revised offer of subagency, and the 
trial court found it to be a fact that "Simons in changing his 
commission split . did so in good faith." (emphasis added) 
(Finding of Fact No. 15) Thus the "good faith" exception under 
the majority rule, which Auerbach's may be read as addressing, 
is simply not an issue herein, having been resolved against the 
position of Bonneville. 
The law of this State pertinent to Bonneville's claim 
is that there is no right to a commission unless Bonneville had 
produced a "written, binding offer" from a "ready, willing and 
able buyer" agreeing to "all terms and conditions." Boyer Co. 
~ Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977). Measured by that standard, 
Bonneville in fact concedes that there can be no recovery with 
the following admission at page 7 of its brief: 
on the effective date of such change, no written 
agreements had been reached . . • regarding the sale 
of the subject property and an exchange which was to 
take place thereafter. 
B. Bonneville's Claim Fails to Satisfy Even the 
Auerbach's Dicta. 
The language quoted by Bonneville from Auerbach's, 
supra, is thus clear dicta, under any view. More important, 
even if it could be considered holding -- even if it could be 
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taken as modifying the reasoned majority position of e.g. 
_ Wicks, supra -- it is clear that Bonneville's claim must never-
theless fail. 
That is so because the gist of the quoted dicta is 
that "Kimball had performed a substantial part of the perfor-
mance required in Auerbach's alleged offer." Here there is no 
finding that Bonneville substantially performed the task of 
producing a written offer, by a ready, willing and able pur-
chaser, on all of the terms specified in the offer. To the 
contrary, it is uncontroverted that Bonneville represented ~ 
~ and produced ~ offer, on those or any other terms. (See 
tesimony of Mr. Emanuel A. Floor at Tr. 231-233) The trial 
judge found it to be a fact "that neither plaintiff nor its 
agents •.. represented A.K. Utah as realtors at any time." 
(Finding of Fact no. 11) Bonneville's claim is based on the 
sole fact that it suggested the ~ of a potential buyer --
something far different than the "substantial performance" this 
Court addressed in Auerbach's. 
The trial judge never concluded that suggesting a 
name amounted to "substantial performance," and indeed he could 
not. His conclusion, rather, is that "the introduction of the 
purchaser's name was significant." (emphasis added) See Con-
clusion of Law No. 5. That is a conclusion of no consequence 
to the settled Utah law of ~' Wicks, supra. It also falls 
short of the "substantial performance" referred to in the 
Auerbach's dicta. 
-5-
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c. Assertions of "Substantial Performance" were never 
Adopted by the Trial Court and are not.Properly urged 
Herein. 
Bonneville's effort to argue that it "has substan-
tially performed," in the absence of any such finding by.the 
trial court (see part B of Point I at Br. 12), amounts to a 
confession of its untenable position. Bonneville is thus re-
quired to depart from the findings of the trial court, the evi-
dence herein, and the settled case law of this jurisdiction, 
and urge matters beyond the evidence and the findings which it 
is not the province of this Court to determin~ on tbis appeal. 
It is urged in that connection that one who "sells" 
property is entitled to a commission (Br. 13), though it is a 
stipulated fact, and determined by the trial judge, that Bonne-
ville did not "sell" the property in question. 
It is further urged that Bonneville "attempted to 
involve itself in negotiations" (Br. 15) and that "Simons pre-
cluded Bonneville from further performing in assisting or 
otherwise negotiating with the respective parties." (Br. 16) 
The trial court made no such determinations and, to the con-
trary found as a fact that Bonneville represented no party to 
the transaction. Bonneville simply had no one to negotiate for 
or involve itself with and in the nature of things Simons could 
not "preclude" Bonneville from negotiating for clients it 
never had.* 
* Bonnneville apparently refers to testimony to the effect 
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The multiple cases cited in conjunction with that 
discussion -- all from other jurisdictions -- thus lack rele-
vance to the facts of this case and their reasoning is at odds 
with the clear pronouncement of this Court that 
A broker is never entitled to commissions for 
unsuccessful efforts. The risk of a failure is 
wholly his. The reward comes only with his success~ 
That is the plain contract and contemplation of the 
parties. The broker may devote his time and labor, 
and expend his money with ever so much devotion to 
the interests of his employer, and yet if he fails, 
if without effecting an agreement for accomplishing a 
bargain, he abandons the effort, or his authority is 
fairly and in good faith terminated, he gains no 
right to commission. E.B. Wicks Co. v. Moyle, 103 
Utah 554, 137 P.2d 342--rI"943). ~ ~ 
POINT II 
APPELLEES FAIL TO EXPLAIN THE 
PROCEDURAL ERRORS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
Bonneville correctly states the law relative to amend-
ment of pleadings and amendments to conform to the evidence. 
(Br. 20-22} It fails, however, to suggest any "prejudice" that 
would result from deciding the cause, in the spirit of modern 
procedure, on the facts adduced at trial rather than some tech-
nical error in plaintiff's answer authored by Simon's prior 
(footnote continued} 
that Dennis Christensen, Bonneville's agent, requested that 
Simons allow him to sit in on negotiations so that he could 
learn the complex and highly specialized commercial and indus-
trial aspect of real estate. Simons replied, in substance, that 
he did not "baby sit," even for his own agents. Such a refusal, 
to one who had no client to negotiate for, was quite reasonable 
and, does not "preclude" Bonneville from further negotiating, 
had it been in a position to do so. 
-7-
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counsel. 
The absence of the poteQtial witness, Gary Jenkins, 
from the state, or 'Bonneville's failure to depose him, cannot 
justify the trial court's refusal to amend the pleadings to 
reflect the fact that Jenkins never represented A.K. Utah. 
That fact was clearly established by the evidence. Granting 
leave to amend could not amount to prejudice, for Simons agreed 
to stipulate what Jenkins' testimony would be. 
On the issues of standing under Utah Code Annotated 
§ 61-2-18 (1953), as amended (Br. 22-23) and custom and usage 
(Br. 23-24), Bonneville correctly states the law, again, but 
in that instance misstates the case. The issue is not whether 
Bonneville can function as a broker, but whether it or its 
licensee, Mr. Sorenson, is the proper party to maintain an 
action for a commission and the legislature has determined 
that he must. 
In relation to custom and usage, the issue is not 
whether Simons pleaded custom and usage, but whether it is 
error to exclude evidence on that point in a claim asserted on 
~ alleged agreement based upon custom and usage. (See the 
stipulation of the parties at Tr. 6) In that regard the rules 
of evidence dictate that Simons may adduce evidence pertinent 
to matters placed in issue by Bonneville. 
It is worthy of note, further, that when the issue 
is "waiver" by reason of Dennis Christensen's settlement of 
the same claim in Federal Court, Bonneville is forced to rely 
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on the same bar of Utah Code Annotated§ 61-2-18 (1953), as 
amended, that Simons invokes against it. (Br. 25-26) Plainly, 
Bonneville cannot have it both ways. Either the statute means 
what it says and Bonneville is out of court, or it doesn't and 
Christensen has already waived the claim. 
As regards all three issues, Bonneville seeks to im-
pose a rigidity reminiscent of the common law -- to evoke pro-
cedural booby traps which have not been condoned since the 
advent of modern notice pleading. The philosophy of modern 
procedure is that causes should be resolved according to the 
facts, rather than the snares a pleader may set or an unwary 
litigant may fall into. The error of the trial judge is that 
he invoked procedures which prevented the true facts from being 
shown, for no reasons which advanced the cause of justice. 
Bonneville can prevail only if the errors in pleading are ex-
haul ted above the primary function of this and every court to 
decide the issues according to the facts. 
In truth, Bonneville may not prevail even if the errors 
involved are thus exhalted. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial judge is supported by 
neither the law nor the evidence. Moreover, the findings of the 
trial court are in and of themselves inconsistent with the deci-
sion, as is made evident by Bonneville's finding it necessary 
to argue matters never determined below in an effort to justify 
the result. 
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For these reasons, and because of the multiple pro-
cedural errors explained in the Brief of Appellant, the decision 
below should be reversed and this action dismissed. 
1982. 
,-.-;... 
Respectfully submitted this 'f /..,..........day of November, 
PARKER M. NIELSON 
MARY LOU GODBE 
Byznry,4~ 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of November, 
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CANNON & WARD, 4885 South 900 East, Suite 210, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, attorneys for respondent. 
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